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The Mexican Asylum System in
Regional Context
HELEN KERWIN†

I. INTRODUCTION
This Article examines the functioning and response of Mexico’s
asylum system to an exponential increase in asylum claims in recent
years within the larger countervailing context of an aggressive border
enforcement policy, in cooperation with the United States, that limits
access to asylum. While scarcity of resources to attend to an evergrowing population of asylum-seekers goes some way toward
explaining the existing protection gaps in the system, Mexico’s policy
of large-scale detention and deportation1 itself constitutes the greatest
barrier to effective access to asylum.
Since the introduction of a new asylum system administered and
adjudicated entirely by the Mexican government in 2011, the number
of asylum petitions presented annually has skyrocketed by more than
1,000 percent, from 752 in 2011 to 8,788 in 2016;2 in 2017, asylum
© 2018 Helen Kerwin
† Legal Fellow, Inter-American Commission on Human Rights. J.D. The University of
Texas School of Law; M.A. International Studies, The University of Oklahoma. The views
expressed in this piece are the author’s alone and do not reflect those of the Inter-American
Commission or any other organization.
1. E.g. Jo Tuckman, Mexico’s Migration Crackdown Escalates Dangers for Central
Americans,
THE
GUARDIAN
(Oct.
13,
2015,
8:30
AM),
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/oct/13/mexico-central-american-migrantsjourney-crackdown; Mexico Deporta más Centroamericanos que EU, EXCELSIOR (June 18,
2015, 2:45 PM), http://www.excelsior.com.mx/nacional/2015/06/18/1030178; see infra
Section II.B.i.
2. Mark Manly (@MarkManly), TWITTER (Aug 23, 2017, 9:48 AM),
https://twitter.com/MarkManly/status/900399250554662912; Mark Manly (@MarkManly),
TWITTER
(Sept.
7,
2017,
9:21
AM),
https://twitter.com/MarkManly/status/905828381228498944. Manly is the current UNHCR
Representative in Mexico.
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petitions reached a historic high of 14,596, fueling concerns about
growing backlogs.3 This growth in asylum petitions largely responds
to worsening conditions in northern Central America (Honduras, El
Salvador, and Guatemala)—where violence associated with gangs
(maras), drug trafficking, and, in lesser measure, state actors, have
caused the highest homicide rates in the world for countries not at
war4—and Venezuela—where a deepening economic and political
crisis has made access to food and medicine precarious.5 Mexico also
receives smaller numbers of Cuban and Haitian asylum-seekers, as
well as asylum-seekers from outside the American continent.6 At the
same time, increased awareness of the existence of asylum in Mexico
has likely led to a greater number of applications year on year.7
Given its proximity to northern Central America, Mexico is a
3. Comisión Nacional de los Derechos Humanos (CNDH), Press Release: La CNDH
hace un llamado urgente al gobierno federal ante el posible colapso del sistema de protección
a refugiados en Mexico [CNDH urgently calls on the federal government given the possible
collapse of the refugee protection system in Mexico], CNDH, February 25, 2018,
http://www.cndh.org.mx/sites/all/doc/Comunicados/2018/Com_2018_046.pdf.
4. See generally Kirk Semple, Fleeing Gangs, Central American Families Surge
Toward
U.S.,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Nov.
12,
2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/13/world/americas/fleeing-gangs-central-americanfamilies-surge-toward-us.html; Emilio González González, Crisis Humanitaria, Violencia
Criminal y Desplazamiento Forzado en el Triángulo Norte de Centroam. . .rica
(Humanitarian Crisis and Survival Migration in Central America’s Northern Triangle), 2
STAN. INT´L POL’Y REV. 27 (2015); Arrancados de Raiz, U.N. HIGHER COMMISSIONER ON
REFUGEES
[hereinafter
UNHCR]
(2014),
http://www.acnur.org/fileadmin/scripts/doc.php?file=fileadmin/Documentos/Publicaciones/2
014/9828; Children on the Run: Unaccompanied Children Leaving Central America and
Mexico and the Need for International Protection, UNHCR 6 (2016),
http://www.unhcr.org/en-us/about-us/background/56fc266f4/children-on-the-run-fullreport.html; Women on the Run: First-Hand Accounts of Refugees Fleeing El Salvador,
Guatemala, Honduras, and Mexico, UNHCR (2015), http://www.unhcr.org/enus/publications/operations/5630f24c6/women-run.html.
5. Meridith Kohut & Isayen Herrera, As Venezuela Collapses, Children Are Dying of
Hunger,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Dec.
17,
2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/12/17/world/americas/venezuela-childrenstarving.html?_r=0; Nicholas Casey, Dying Infants and No Medicine: Inside Venezuela’s
Failing
Hospitals,
N.Y.
TIMES
(May
15,
2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/16/world/americas/dying-infants-and-no-medicineinside-venezuelas-failing-hospitals.html; Nicholas Casey, Venezuelans Ransack Stores as
Hunger
Grips
the
Nation,
N.Y.
TIMES
(June
19,
2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/20/world/americas/venezuelans-ransack-stores-ashunger-stalks-crumbling-nation.html; see also Operation Portal: Venezuela Situation,
UNHCR (2018), https://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/vensit (last visited Mar. 24, 2018).
6. Comisión Mexicana de Ayuda a Refugiados (COMAR), Estadísticas 2013–2017 (4to
semestre) [Statistics 2013–2017 (4th quarter)], SEGOB SECRETARÍA DE GOBERNACIÓN,
https://www.gob.mx/cms/uploads/attachment/file/290340/ESTADISTICAS_2013_A_4TO_
TRIMESTRE_2017.pdf (last visited May 12, 2018).
7. See, e.g., Andrea Villaseñor & Elba Coria, Protection Gaps in Mexico, FORCED
MIGRATION REV. 6–9 (Oct. 2017).
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critical country of asylum for persons fleeing violence in Honduras, El
Salvador, and Guatemala. But Mexico’s immigration policy in recent
years has been better characterized by increased immigration
enforcement and a heightened number of detentions and deportations,
particularly following the so-called “surge” of unaccompanied Central
American children who arrived at the United States’ southern border
in the summer of 2014 and the contemporaneous introduction of
Mexico’s Plan Frontera Sur (“Southern Border Plan”), first announced
in July 2014.8 Mexico’s aggressive border enforcement has decreased
access to the US’ southern border—including to ports of entry,9 where
asylum-seekers have the right under international law to seek
asylum—and correspondingly lowered detentions and deportations of
Central Americans.
The logic of aggressive border enforcement dramatically impacts
the availability of asylum to people who need it. This is evident, first,
in the disparity between the number of deportations of Central
Americans and the number of asylum petitions presented by Central
Americans during this period—in 2016, less than six percent of the
total number of Central Americans detained by Mexican authorities
presented asylum petitions.10 While no comprehensive studies
currently exist on the total number of Central American nationals
leaving their countries who may be in need of international protection,
UNHCR has indicated that up to half of all Northern Triangle nationals
leaving their countries could be in need of international protection.11
The case of unaccompanied children is especially egregious. One study
conducted in 2016 indicates that 58 percent of children leaving Central
America may need international protection;12 however, among the tens
of thousands of children detained and deported each year, just 229
unaccompanied children presented asylum petitions in 2016.13 These
8. See infra Section II.B.i.
9. Caitlin Dickerson & Miriam Jordan, ‘No Asylum Here’: Some Say U.S. Border
Agents
Rejected
Them,
N.Y.
TIMES
(May
3,
2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/03/us/asylum-border-customs.html?_r=1&ref=nytes&mcid=nyt-es&subid=article.
10. Boletines Estadisticos, SEGOB SECRETARÍA DE GOBERNACIÓN (Jan. 31, 2018),
http://www.politicamigratoria.gob.mx/es_mx/SEGOB/Boletines_Estadisticos (according to
government statistics, Mexico carried out 147,370 deportations in 2016 and received 8,788
asylum petitions in the same year).
11. James Frederick, Before Migrants Reach U.S., Mexico Deports Central Americans,
NPR (Aug. 26, 2016, 4:29 PM), https://www.npr.org/2016/08/26/491531862/beforemigrants-reach-u-s-mexico-deports-central-americans; see also Children on the Run, supra
note 4, at 6; Women on the Run, supra note 4.
12. Children on the Run, supra note 4, at 6.
13. This represents a slight increase over 138 petitions presented in 2015, and 55
presented in 2013.
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data indicate serious gaps in access to protection for those who wish to
seek it in Mexico.
This article proceeds in three parts: first, it describes Mexico’s
substantive asylum law and adjudication in theory and in practice,
based partially on interviews with Mexican asylum practitioners; 14
second, it analyzes some of the most serious barriers to asylum in
Mexico, loosely classified into issues related to resource constraints
and issues related to the policy of massive detention and deportation,
signaling in particular the concerning situation of unaccompanied
children. Finally, it concludes by considering the importance of both
ensuring that Mexico’s asylum system provides accessible and
effective international protection to those who need it and choose to
pursue it, while also recognizing the importance of family unity and
effective enjoyment of rights for vulnerable groups, and that the
asylum system is not itself a mechanism of border control.
II. LEGAL FRAMEWORK AND THE ADMINISTRATIVE ASYLUM PROCESS
Mexico’s substantive law of asylum offers fairly broad protection
based on a variety of international and regional sources, and the
administrative asylum process administered by the Mexican Refugee
Commission (“COMAR,” Comisión Mexicana de Ayuda a
Refugiados) is designed to be efficient. However, in practice,
practitioners express concerns about the application of the law and the
celerity and fairness of the administrative process. This section of the
Article provides basic information about Mexico’s asylum law and
administrative asylum process, about which there is little information
available in English to date, as well as about the practical application
of the law and procedure.
A. The Substantive Law
Mexico’s refugee law, the Law on Refugees, Complementary
Protection, and Political Asylum (Ley sobre Refugiados, Protección
Complementaria y Asilo Político), was passed in 2011 and updated in
2014.15 The law incorporates four separate forms of international
14. Interviews with Representatives from Fray Matías Centro de Derechos Humanos
(from Tapachula and Tuxtla Gutierrez, Chiapas), Sin Fronteras (from Mexico City), and
Representatives from the Clínica Jurídica de Refugiados “Alaíde Foppa” (from the
Universidad Iberoamericana in Mexico City). Interviews took place in Austin, Tx. (May 9,
2017).
15. Ley Sobre Refugiados y Protección Complementaria (Law on Refugees and
Complementary Protection), Diario Oficial de la Federación [DOF] 27-01-2011, últimas
reformas DOF 30-10-2014 (Mex.).
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protection: 1) Convention asylum, based on the definition in the 1951
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees;16 2) Cartagena asylum,
based on the expanded refugee definition set out in the 1984 Cartagena
Declaration on Refugees;17 3) “complementary protection,” based on
the concept of non-refoulement;18 and 4) political asylum, derived from
the regional tradition of granting discretionary asylum on political
grounds in Latin America.19 There is no legal difference between
16. 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (Refugee Convention), July 21,
1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 2545; 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees (Refugee
Protocol),
Jan.
31,
1967,
606
U.N.T.S.
8791
(both
available
at:
http://www.unhcr.org/3b66c2aa10.pdf); Ley Sobre Refugiados y Protección Complementaria
(Law on Refugees and Complementary Protection), art. 13, sec. I, Diario Oficial de la
Federación [DOF] 27-01-2011, últimas reformas DOF 30-10-2014 (Mex.); Mexico’s law
expands the Convention definition to include gender, defined as “the gender or sexual
preferences of the applicant,” as a protected ground. This definition helps to ensure recognition
of claims based on sexual and gender-based violence, and claims by LGBTQ asylum-seekers.
Reglamento de la Ley Sobre Refugiados y Protección Complementaria (Regulations of the
Law on Refugees and Complementary Protection) [RLRPC], art. 4, sec. IV, Diario Oficial de
la Federación [DOF] 21-02-2012 (Mex.).
17. Cartagena Declaration on Refugees, Colloquium on the International Protection of
Refugees in Central America, Mexico and Panama (Cartagena Declaration), Nov. 22, 1984,
https://www.oas.org/dil/1984_cartagena_declaration_on_refugees.pdf; Ley Sobre Refugiados
y Protección Complementaria (Law on Refugees and Complementary Protection), art.13 sec.
II, Diario Oficial de la Federación [DOF] 27-01-2011, últimas reformas DOF 30-10-2014
(Mex.). This Declaration created an expanded definition of refugee in light of a massive
increase during the 1980s of Central Americans in need of international protection who did
not fit the 1951 Convention definition, including those fleeing their countries “because their
lives, safety or freedom have been threatened by generalized violence, foreign aggression,
internal conflicts, massive violation of human rights or other circumstances which have
seriously disturbed public order,” (Cartagena Declaration) 3, Nov. 22, 1984,
https://www.oas.org/dil/1984_cartagena_declaration_on_refugees.pdf.
18. Ley Sobre Refugiados y Protección Complementaria (Law on Refugees and
Complementary Protection), art. 28, art. 2, sec. VII, Diario Oficial de la Federación [DOF] 2701-2011, últimas reformas DOF 30-10-2014 (Mex.); see also Ley Sobre Refugiados y
Protección Complementaria (Law on Refugees and Complementary Protection), art. 29-31,
Diario Oficial de la Federación [DOF] 27-01-2011, últimas reformas DOF 30-10-2014
(Mex.); “Complementary Protection” in Mexican law is similar to Withholding of Removal
under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT Withholding”) in US law, granting protection
to individuals not recognized as refugees but who require protection in order not to be
“returned to the territory of another country where their life would be threatened or where
there are reasonable grounds to believe that they would be in danger of being subjected to
torture or other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment.” A grant of
complementary protection is only considered, but is considered automatically, upon the denial
of an asylum claim. Ley Sobre Refugiados y Protección Complementaria (Law on Refugees
and Complementary Protection), art. 32, Diario Oficial de la Federación [DOF] 27-012011, últimas reformas DOF 30-10-2014 (Mex.).
19. “Protection granted by the Mexican State to a foreigner who it considers is persecuted
for political motives or crimes, or for common crimes that are connected to political motives,
whose life, liberty, or security is in danger. The protection may be requested by diplomatic or
territorial channels.” Ley Sobre Refugiados y Protección Complementaria (Law on Refugees
and Complementary Protection), art. 2 sec. I, Diario Oficial de la Federación [DOF] 27-012011, últimas reformas DOF 30-10-2014 (Mex.); see also Ficha T. . .cnica Sobre el Derecho
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refugees recognized under the 1951 Convention definition and the
Cartagena definition in Mexico; all receive the same legal status and
legal benefits upon a positive adjudication.20 The exclusion and
cessation grounds included in the 1951 Convention are also
incorporated into the Mexican law.21
COMAR has not apparently used any part of the Cartagena
definition in favor of Central American applicants to date, continuing
to find that the violence in the Northern Triangle countries, though
pervasive, is not indiscriminate but remains targeted against specific
individuals.22 However, practitioners report that since 2016, COMAR
has begun to use the “massive violations of human rights” subsection
of the Cartagena Declaration to recognize claims by Venezuelans,
citing the lack of access to basic nutrition and medication in that
country.23
In addition to the Law on Refugees, additional sources of relevant
law include the Law’s implementing Regulations (Reglamento de la
Ley sobre Refugiados, Protección Complementaria y Asilo Político),24
the Migration Law (Ley de Migración)25 and its implementing
Regulations (Reglamento de la Ley de Migración),26 the General Law
a
Buscar
y
Recibir
Asilo,
UNHCR,
2-3,
(Art.
22.7)
http://www.acnur.org/fileadmin/scripts/doc.php?file=fileadmin/Documentos/BDL/2017/112
16 (on the history of political asylum in Latin America).
20. See Ley Sobre Refugiados y Protección Complementaria (Law on Refugees,
Complementary Protection and Political Asylum), Diario Oficial de la Federación [DOF] 2701-2011, últimas reformas DOF 30-10-2014 (Mex.) (creating same legal benefits for all
“refugees”).
21. See 1951 Convention, Art. 1(c),(f); Ley Sobre Refugiados, Protección
Complementaria y Asilo Político (Law on Refugees, Complementary Protection and Political
Asylum), arts. 27, art. 34, Diario Oficial de la Federación [DOF] 27-01-2011, últimas reformas
DOF 30-10-2014 (Mex.).
22. See also Eligibility Guidelines for Assessing the International Protection Needs of
Asylum-Seekers
from
El
Salvador,
UNHCR
45
(2016),
http://www.refworld.org/docid/56e706e94.html; Eligibility Guidelines for Assessing the
International Protection Needs of Asylum-Seekers from Honduras, UNHCR (2016),
http://www.refworld.org/docid/579767434.html. (Both of these documents consider that the
violence in those countries is not indiscriminate).
23. See also Josefina Salomón, Venezolano Cambiaría Forma en que México Trata a
Refugiados [Venezuelan Man Would Change the Way Mexico Treats Refugees], NEWSWEEK
EN ESPAÑOL (Dec. 21, 2017), https://newsweekespanol.com/2017/12/venezolano-cambiariaforma-en-que-mexico-trata-refugiados/.
24. Reglamento de la Ley Sobre Refugiados y Protección Complementaria (Regulations
of the Law on Refugees and Complementary Protection) [RLRPC], Diario Oficial de la
Federación [DOF] 21-02-2012 (Mex.).
25. Ley de Migración (Migration Law) [LM], Diario Oficial de la Federación [DOF] 2505-2011, últimas reformas DOF 21-04-2016 (Mex.).
26. Reglamento de la Ley de Migración, Diario Oficial de la Federación (Regulations of
the Law on Migration) [DOF] 28-09-2012, últimas reformas DOF 23-05-2014. (Mex.).
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on Children’s Rights (Ley General de los Derechos las Niñas, Niños y
Adolescentes, LGDNNA)27 and its implementing Regulations
(Reglamento de la LGDNNA).28 Because Mexico has accepted the
jurisdiction of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights and, since
its 2011 constitutional reform, incorporated international human rights
law into its internal law, Inter-American legal precedents on asylum
are also an important source of law.29
Mexico’s Law on Migration (Ley de Migración) also creates a
visa for “visitors for humanitarian reasons” (“visitante por razones
humanitarias”), available according to the terms of the law to migrants
who have been the victim or witness of a crime in Mexico and report
the crime to the police; asylum-seekers; and unaccompanied children.30
The visa is valid for one year, or for the duration of the asylum
proceedings, and does not create a path to permanent residency. 31 By
law, holders of humanitarian visas are authorized to work, but
practitioners indicate that the ID cards granted to visa holders do not
indicate actual work authorization and do not contain a clave única de
registro de población (CURP, like a Social Security number), both of
which make practical access to legal work difficult or impossible in
27. Ley General de los Derechos las Niñas, Niños y Adolescentes, [LGDNNA], Diario
Oficial de la Federación [DOF] 04-12-2014 (Mex.).
28. Reglamento de La Ley General De Los Derechos De Niños, Niñas, y Adolescents
[RGDNNA] Diario Oficial de la Federación, 02-12-2015 (Mex.).
29. Key Inter-American Court decisions regarding asylum include: Familia Pacheco
Tineo v. Bolivia, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am.
Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 272 (Nov. 13, 2013); and Rights and Guarantees of Children in the
Context of Migration and/or in Need of International Protection, Advisory Opinion 21/14,
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. 21) (Aug. 19, 2014). The Inter-American Commission’s report,
Human Rights of Migrants, Refugees, Stateless Persons, Victims of Human Trafficking and
Internally Displaced Persons: Norms and Standards of the Inter-American Human Rights
System (2015), http://www.oas.org/en/iachr/reports/pdfs/HumanMobility.pdf, compiles other
relevant cases and standards of the Inter-American Commission and Inter-American Court.
An interesting new development in the area of Inter-American jurisprudence on asylum are
the precautionary measures granted by the Inter-American Commission in 2016 in the cases
of E.S.G. and A.E.S.G. v. US, Precautionary Measure No. 297-15, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R.,
Resolution 30/2016, (May 11, 2016), and D.S. v. U.S., Precautionary Measure No. 152-16,
Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Resolution 21/2016, (April 9, 2016) (involving Salvadoran
claimants alleging serious due process violations in expedited removal proceedings).
The reports: Refugees and Migrants in the United States: Families and Unaccompanied
Children, INTER-AMERICAN COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS [IACHR] (June 24, 2015),
http://www.oas.org/en/iachr/reports/pdfs/Refugees-Migrants-US.pdf; and Human Rights of
Migrants and Other Persons in the Context of Human Mobility in Mexico, INTER-AMERICAN
COMMISSION
ON
HUMAN
RIGHTS
[IACHR]
(Dec.
30,
2013),
http://www.oas.org/en/iachr/migrants/docs/pdf/report-migrants-mexico-2013.pdf
also
contain useful Inter-American legal standards and analysis.
30. Ley de Migración (Migration Law) [LM], art. 52 sec. V, Diario Oficial de la
Federación [DOF] 25-05-2011, últimas reformas DOF 21-04-2016 (Mex.).
31. Id.
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B. The Administrative Asylum Process
Asylum applications are handled by the Mexican Refugee
Commission (“COMAR”)33 in a purely administrative (nonadversarial) process.34 By statute, the process lasts 45 business days
(about three months), with up to ten additional business days (two
weeks) to analyze the possibility of granting complementary protection
after a denial of asylum;35 however, wait times continue to increase
given the growing number of asylum claims and limited institutional
capacity to process them, and many claims were even indefinitely
suspended following the September 2017 earthquake that affected
Mexico City.36 The process includes one merits interview toward the
end of the 45 day period; these interviews generally last about two
hours, and asylum-seekers are permitted to have a lawyer present
(though the lawyer is not always permitted to speak), as well as in some
cases a psychologist.37
By law, asylum-seekers must present themselves before any
COMAR office or National Migration Institute (“INM”)38 delegation
in the country to request asylum within 30 business days of their entry
32. Interview with lawyer from Sin Fronteras, supra note 14. See also, e.g., Mark Manly,
(@MarkManly),
TWITTER
(Sept.
6,
2017,
6:10
PM)
https://twitter.com/MarkManly/status/905599203681812481.
33. Both COMAR and INM are located within the Ministry of the Interior (Secretaria de
Gobernación, SEGOB). COMAR has existed since the 1980s, though prior to the 2011 law
reform its role was largely focused on the provision of humanitarian aid. For decades, UNHCR
performed refugee status determination in Mexico by mandate; COMAR began adjudicating
refugee claims in collaboration with UNHCR in 2003, and assumed complete control over the
adjudication of refugee claims in 2011, after the Refugee Law was passed. Relevant legal
norms governing COMAR’s work can be found at: Marca Normativo en Materia de
Refugiados, COMISIÓN MEXICANA DE AYUDA REFUGIADOS (Mar. 9, 2016),
http://www.gob.mx/comar/documentos/marco-juridico-en-materia-de-refugiados.
34. There is no adversarial asylum process analogous to defensive asylum proceedings
before an Immigration Judge in the US; all asylum claims are handled administratively in the
first instance by COMAR’s asylum officers.
35. Reglamento de la Ley de Migración, Art. 45, Diario Oficial de la Federación [DOF]
28-09-2012, últimas reformas DOF 23-05-2014. (Mex.).
36. Comisión Nacional de los Derechos Humanos (CNDH), Press Release: La CNDH
hace un llamado urgente al gobierno federal ante el posible colapso del sistema de protección
a refugiados en México [CNDH urgently calls on the federal government given the possible
collapse of the refugee protection system in Mexico], CNDH, February 25, 2018,
http://www.cndh.org.mx/sites/all/doc/Comunicados/2018/Com_2018_046.pdf.
37. Interview with Representatives from Fray Matías Centro de Derechos Humanos, Sin
Fronteras, Clínica Jurídica de Refugiados “Alaíde Foppa,” supra note 14.
38. INM is responsible for immigration enforcement in Mexico, performing functions
analogous to Customs and Border Protection (CBP) and Immigration and Customs
Enforcement (ICE) in the US.
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into the country.39 COMAR offices currently exist only in Mexico City;
Tapachula, Chiapas; and Acayucan, Veracruz.40 INM delegations exist
throughout the country.41 Any person in immigration detention
(estación migratoria, EM) may request asylum before the INM
officers present there; nonetheless, a number of problems inside the
centers impede migrants from requesting asylum in detention.42 While
many asylum-seekers remain detained for the duration of the
adjudication of their asylum claim, alternatives to detention are
sometimes granted to asylum-seekers.43
All asylum-seekers whose claims are denied by COMAR are
entitled to an administrative review of the decision by the same agency
through a recurso de revisión.44 Essentially, upon filing the recurso de
revisión, the 45-business-day clock is restarted, and the decision is
reviewed.45 However, this review generally examines only the legality
of the process (without re-assessing the merits of the claim);
practitioners advise that they generally pursue recursos de revisión
only when there are extremely evident problems with the first-instance
decision, such as incorrect names or material facts in the decision.46
Further appeals after a negative decision may be pursued via a juicio
de nulidad, a legal proceeding in which the asylum-seeker petitions to
have COMAR’s previous order vacated (“nullified”) and substituted
with a favorable decision, before the Tribunal Federal de Justicia
Administrativa (“TFJA”), an administrative law tribunal.47 Historically
39. Ley de Migración (Mgration Law) [LM], art. 18, Diario Oficial de la Federación
[DOF] 25-05-2011, últimas reformas DOF 21-04-2016 (Mex.).
40. Oficinas y delegaciones de la COMAR, COMISIÓN MEXICANA DE AYUDA A
REFUGIADOS, last visited May 12, 2018, http://www.comar.gob.mx/en/COMAR/Oficinas.
41. Horario y Oficinas del INM, INSTITUTO NACIONAL DE MIGRACIÓN (June 14, 2016),
https://www.gob.mx/inm/acciones-y-programas/horario-y-oficinas-del-inm.
42. See infra Section II.B.ii.
43. Id.
44. Ley de Migración (Migration Law) [LM], art. 25, Diario Oficial de la Federación
[DOF] 25-05-2011, últimas reformas DOF 21-04-2016 (Mex.).
45. Id.
46. Interview with Representatives from Sin Fronteras and Clínica Jurídica de
Refugiados “Alaíde Foppa,” supra note 14.
47. Id.; see also Article 83 of the Federal Law on Administrative Procedure: “A judicial
review or, when appropriate, a judicial trial corresponds against the acts and resolutions of
administrative authorities that finalized the administrative procedure”. Ley Federal de
Procedimiento Administrativo (Federal Adminstrative Procedure Law) [LFPA], Art. 83,
Diario Oficial de la Federación [DOF] 08-04-1994, últimos reformas DOF 19-04-2000, 3005-2000 (Mex.); Ley Sobre Refugiados, Protección Complementaria y Asilo Político, arts. 25,
39, and 47, Diario Oficial de la Federación [DOF], 27-01-2011, últimas reformas DOF 30-102014 (Mex.); Reglamento de la Ley Sobre Refugiados y Protección Complementaria
(Regulation of the Law on Refugees and Conplementary Protections) [RLRPC], arts. 45, 55,
59, & 60, Diario Oficial de la Federación [DOF], 21-02-2012 (Mex.); Ley Federal del
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a tax court, the tribunal has been the subject of criticisms by
practitioners that its magistrates and staff are not familiar with human
rights law or especially well-equipped or trained to adjudicate refugee
cases.48 There are an increasing number of TFJA precedents on refugee
law that COMAR is bound to follow; these precedents could be
overruled by future precedents from the Poder Judicial (the judicial
branch).
Asylum-seekers may also seek judicial protection via a recurso
de amparo, a constitutional claim brought when human rights have
been violated.49 Asylum-seekers may seek an amparo before the courts
at any point to allege human rights violations in the asylum process
(e.g. in the context of detention). For example, one court recently ruled
in an (non-precedential) amparo proceeding that detention of asylumseekers is exceptional, and liberty should be the rule.50 To date, there
is no binding precedent on refugee law from the judicial power.51
Asylum-seekers and migrants can also present complaints to
Mexico’s National Human Rights Commission (“CNDH”) about any
human rights violation they suffer in Mexico (including for example
immigration detention conditions, due process violations in the asylum
process, children’s rights violations, and so on).52 The CNDH does not
have any formal role in the asylum adjudication process, and so cannot
review or revise decisions in individual cases, but its recommendations
can change policies and practices within relevant institutions,
including COMAR and INM.53 CNDH complaints are also useful as an
Procedimiento Contencioso Administrativo (Federal Law of Administrative Disputes
Procedures) [LFPCA], Art. 2, Diario Oficial de la Federación [DOF] 01-12-2005, últimas
reformas DOF 27-01-2017 (Mex.).
48. Jorge Ríos, Un “Tribunal de Asilo” para México, SINEMBARGO (June 7, 2016),
http://www.sinembargo.mx/07-07-2016/3063642; Evolución y Retos del Asilo en M. . .xico,
SIN
FRONTERAS
I.A.P.,
55
(2016),
http://sinfronteras.org.mx/wpcontent/uploads/2017/06/InformeAsilo_2016_WEB_02.pdf.
49. Ley de Amparo, Reglamentaria de los Artículos 103 y 107 de la Constitución Política
de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos (Constitutional Protection Law, Regulating Articles 103 and
107 of the Political Constitution fo the Mexican United States) [LARACPEUM], art. 1, Diario
Oficial de la Federación [DOF] 10-01-2011, últimas reforma DOF 06-17-2016 (Mex.).
50. See En principio, solicitantes de asilo no podrán ser privados de libertad, fallo
histórico del Poder Judicial en México [¡Conoce la sentencia!], IJPP/CJR “Alaíde Foppa,”
(May 5, 2017), http://ijpp.mx/images/IJPP-comunicado-PJF-fallo-historico-2017.pdf.
51. Interview with Representatives from Sin Fronteras, supra note 14.
52. Id.; see also Quinta Vistaduría General, COMISIÓN DE LOS DERECHOS HUMANOS, last
visited May 12, 2018, http://www.cndh.org.mx/Estructura (information under “Quinta
Visitaduría”).
53. For example, the CNDH recently declared irregularities in COMAR’s adjudication
practices and INM’s detention practices. Recomendación de CNDH Reconoce que COMAR e
INM Violan Derechos Humanos de Solicitantes de Asilo [CNDH recommendation recognizes

KERWIN - THE MEXICAN ASYLUM SYSTEM FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

5/15/2018 12:34 PM

300

[Vol. 33:290

MARYLAND JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

information-gathering mechanism.54
III. CURRENT CHALLENGES FOR MEXICO’S ASYLUM SYSTEM
A. Growing Numbers of Asylum-Seekers Strain COMAR and
Civil Society Capacity
The number of asylum claims presented each year in Mexico has
skyrocketed since 2011.55 While the makeup of asylum applications
has been fairly constant in recent years, with Honduras consistently in
first place and El Salvador in second or third, in 2017, the number of
Venezuelan asylum claimants increased significantly.56
While these growing numbers likely reflect a growth in the
absolute number of persons in need of international protection fleeing
Central America, they also undoubtedly indicate an increased
knowledge of and access to the asylum system in Mexico, driven by
increased outreach efforts by governmental, international, and civil
society agencies, and word of mouth. A growth in asylum claims of
more than 1000 percent in six years has, unsurprisingly, put serious
strain on existing systems for aid and attention to migrants. The
following sections examine some of the administrative strains being
put on this system.
1. COMAR
Undoubtedly the most serious barrier to the effective adjudication
of asylum claims in Mexico is COMAR’s extremely limited staff and
its limited geographic reach. Until late 2016, there were fewer than 20
COMAR officials in the country; there are now reportedly between 30
and 40 officials who hear and decide cases.57 The statutory 45-day
that COMAR and INM violate the human rights of asylum-seekers], CMDPDH (Oct. 20,
2017),
http://cmdpdh.org/2017/10/recomendacion-cndh-reconoce-comar-e-inm-violanderechos-humanos-solicitantes-asilo/.
54. Interview with Representatives from Sin Fronteras and Clinica Jurídica de
Refugiados “Alaíde Foppa,” supra note 14.
55. See supra notes 2, 3 and accompanying text; Kevin Lui, Mexico’s Asylum Application
Numbers Are Up by 150% Since the U.S. Election, TIME (Apr. 19, 2017),
http://time.com/4745785/mexico-asylum-applications-trump-election/.
56. Mark Manly, (@MarkManly), TWITTER (Sept. 7, 2017, 9:21 AM),
https://twitter.com/MarkManly/status/905828381228498944.
57. Interview with Representatives from Sin Fronteras, Clínica Juridica de Refugiados
“Alaíde Foppa,” and Fray Matías Centro de Derechos Humanos, supra note 14; see also Luis
Alfredo Arriola Vega, Policy Adrift: Mexico´s Southern Border Program, JAMES A. BAKER III
INSTITUTE FOR PUBLIC POLICY OF RICE UNIVERSITY, 4 (June 2017),
https://www.bakerinstitute.org/media/files/files/fa7ac127/MEX-pub-FronteraSur-
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period for adjudication is being extended (usually for an additional
forty-five days) due to the high numbers of petitions with increasing
frequency, reportedly often without advising asylum-seekers—and
since the October 2017 earthquake that affected Mexico City, wait
times are reportedly even longer.58 Staff turnover is reported to be very
high, making training a constant challenge.59
In this context, practitioners report that decisions by COMAR
often demonstrate a lack of legal analysis and reasoning.60 This is likely
a result both of limited training and limited time to spend on cases.
Another serious procedural flaw identified by practitioners is that
COMAR generally interviews only the person designated as the
principal applicant on the petition (usually the male head of
household), which is both machista and can lead to negative case
outcomes when other family members, including wives and adolescent
children, have relevant information about the claim but are not given
the opportunity to communicate it to adjudicators. Additionally, merits
interviews are recorded, but practitioners report that it is more common
for COMAR officials to review and use the interview notes (which are
not a transcript) for their written decision.61 Practitioners report that
COMAR is regularly performing interviews just a few days before the
45-day window for adjudication runs out, raising concerns that
COMAR is writing its decisions largely on the basis of the intake
forms, rather than on the interviews.62 Taken together, these issues
present serious concerns about the consistency and fairness of the
COMAR adjudication process.63

062317.pdf.
58. Diana Higareda, México deja a refugiados en el limbo, EL UNIVERSAL (Apr. 2, 2018),
http://www.eluniversal.com.mx/nacion/sociedad/mexico-deja-refugiados-en-el-limbo.
59. Interview with Representatives from Fray Matías Centro de Derechos Humanos, Sin
Fronteras, Clínica Jurídica de Refugiados “Alaíde Foppa,” supra note 14.
60. Id.; see also Informe Preliminar: La interpretación y aplicación del derecho
internacional y nacional de los refugiados en México: Análisis de las resoluciones de primera
instancia de la Comisión Mexicana de Ayuda a Refugiados, COMISIÓN MEXICANA DE AYUDA
A
REFUGIADOS
(2017),
http://192.203.177.41/sites/all/themes/ibero/descargables/ibero/pdh/resumen-ejecutivoinforme-asilo.pdf.
61. Interview with Representatives from Clínica Jurídica de Refugiados “Alaíde Foppa,”
Fray Matías Centro de Derechos Humanos, and Sin Fronteras, supra note 14.
62. Id.
63. The phenomenon of disparities in asylum adjudication is an issue that would also
benefit from further comparative research among countries in the future, in the areas of both
procedural due process and substantive guarantees of protection. See, e.g., JAYA RAMJINOGALES, ANDREW I. SCHOENHOLTZ, & PHILIP G. SCHRAG, REFUGEE ROULETTE: DISPARITIES
IN ASYLUM ADJUDICATION AND PROPOSALS FOR REFORM (2009); REBECCA HAMLIN, LET ME
BE A REFUGEE: ADMINISTRATIVE JUSTICE AND THE POLITICS OF ASYLUM IN THE UNITED STATES,
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Because COMAR has brick-and-mortar delegations only in
Mexico City, Tapachula, and Acayucan, asylum claims presented in
other parts of the country may be adjudicated by the Mexico City
office, or by mobile field units.64 These geographic limitations mean
that asylum interviews often take place in general immigration
facilities rather than in dedicated asylum offices. They also often take
place by telephone under inadequate conditions, including a lack of
privacy, though advocacy by practitioners is beginning to change the
practice of telephone interviews.65
2. Civil Society
The increase in asylum-seekers in Mexico has also placed
corresponding burdens on civil society actors, including migrant
shelters, lawyers, social workers, psychotherapists, food banks, and
other providers of humanitarian aid, among others.
The migrant shelter network in Mexico continues to adjust to
provide services to asylum-seekers during multi-month stays, rather
than to migrant workers during overnight stays, with substantial
financial and logistical support from UNHCR.66 These shelters provide
an important point of civil society contact with migrants in Mexico,
providing humanitarian aid and information about access to asylum, as
well as a point of contact to gather demographic and qualitative data
about the situation of irregular migrants in Mexico.67
The few NGOs that provide legal representation to asylumseekers are similarly strained by the growing demand for their services.
CANADA, AND AUSTRALIA (2014).
64. Oficinas y Delegaciones de la COMAR, supra note 40.
65. Interview with Representatives from Fray Matías Centro de Derechos Humanos,
Clínica Jurídica de Refugiados “Alaíde Foppa,” supra note 14.
66. Alejandro Olayo-Méndez, La 72: An Oasis Along the Migration Routes in Mexico,
56 FORCED MIGRATION REV. 10, 10–11 (2017); Víctor Hugo Gutierrez Albertos, La 72 Como
Espacio Intercultural de Emancipación y Resistencia Trans en la Frontera sur de México, XII
No. 2 PENÍNSULA 69, 80 (2017); Mexican Shelter Provides Safe Space for Central Americans,
UNHCR
(Oct.
17,
2017),
http://www.unhcr.org/enus/news/latest/2017/10/59e085fb4/mexican-shelter-provides-safe-space-centralamericans.html.
67. See, e.g., REDODEM (Red de Documentación de las Organizaciones Defensoras de
Migrantes), MIGRACIÓN EN TRÁNSITO: ROSTRO DE UNA CRISIS HUMANITARIA INTERNACIONAL
(2016), https://www.entreculturas.org/sites/default/files/informe_redodem.pdf (report on the
situation of irregular migrants in Mexico based on data gathered by a network of migrant
shelters across Mexico); CNDH, LOS DESAFÍOS DE LA MIGRACIÓN Y LOS ALBERGUES COMO
OASIS: ENCUESTA NACIONAL DE PERSONAS MIGRANTES EN TRÁNSITO POR MÉXICO (2017),
http://www.cndh.org.mx/sites/all/doc/Informes/Especiales/Informe-Especial-Desafiosmigracion.pdf.
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Lawyers additionally report barriers to performing their jobs, including
limitations on the scope of representation permitted by COMAR.68 The
availability of psychological services for asylum-seekers and refugees,
particularly outside of Mexico City, is similarly limited.69
Asylum-seekers often face serious barriers to making ends meet
and integrating into Mexican society.70 Humanitarian assistance and
other assistance to asylum-seekers remains limited, and perhaps the
most common complaint among asylum-seekers is that it is difficult in
practice to find legal work.71 First, because their legal work
authorization is difficult to prove and access, and second, because the
lived experience of being an asylum-seeker in Mexico is one of waiting
in endless queues: to check in weekly with COMAR and/or INM, and
to obtain humanitarian aid, medical care, and food.72 These realities
severely limit the options for stable work.73 Difficulty finding work,
or well-paid work, makes conditions of life difficult for asylumseekers.74
B. The Larger Context of Aggressive Border Enforcement Limits
Access to Asylum
Notwithstanding the serious challenges to accessing asylum in
Mexico generated by the context of scarce resources described above,
access is much more severely limited by Mexico’s wider immigration
policy of large-scale detention and deportation. This limits migrants’
access to information about asylum as well as access to the proceeding
itself, disincentivizes migrants from beginning or completing the
process, including due to intolerable detention conditions, and
68. Interview with Representatives from Fray Matías Centro de Derechos Humanos,
Clínica Jurídica de Refugiados “Alaíde Foppa,” and Sin Fronteras, supra note 14.
69. Id.; see also Comisión Interamericana de Derechos Humanos, México: Solicitantes
de
Asilo
y
Refugiados,
YOUTUBE
(Mar.
17,
2017),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=i8eQaP89u_c; Inter-American Commission on Human
Rights (IACHR), Report on the 161st Session of the IACHR (Mar. 22, 2017),
http://www.oas.org/en/iachr/media_center/PReleases/2017/035A.asp (giving brief summary
in English of “Mexico: Solicitantes de asilo y refugiados”); Situación de los Derechos
Humanos de las Personas Solicitantes de Asilo y Refugiadas en México, 20–26 (Mar. 17,
2017)
http://sinfronteras.org.mx/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/InformeAuienciaCIDH_17_Marzo.pdf (report from above-referenced hearing).
70. Interview with Representatives from Fray Matías Centro de Derechos Humanos,
Clínica Jurídica de Refugiados “Alaíde Foppa,” and Sin Fronteras, supra note 14; see also
Diana Higareda, México deja a refugiados en limbo, EL UNIVERSAL (Apr. 2, 2018),
http://www.eluniversal.com.mx/nacion/sociedad/mexico-deja-refugiados-en-el-limbo.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id.
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particularly harms unaccompanied children.
1. Plan Frontera Sur and U.S.-Mexico Border Enforcement
Cooperation
Mexico’s growing asylum system exists within a larger policy
context of mass immigration detention, and deportation, carried out
largely for the benefit of the United States.75 The United States has
specifically cooperated with and given money to Mexico for border
enforcement at least since 2008, within the framework of the Mérida
Initiative.76 Since July 2014, when the so-called “Plan Frontera Sur”
(“Southern Border Plan”) was first publicly announced,77 Mexico has
substantially increased immigration enforcement across the country,
particularly in the southern states.78 The announcement of the Plan
Frontera Sur coincided virtually exactly with the peak of the “surge”
of unaccompanied Central American children arriving on the U.S.’s
southern border, which provoked heavy media coverage and public
concern that the children presented a grave threat to U.S. border
security and an unsustainable burden on its immigration system.79 The
Plan Frontera Sur was created to address migration, security, and
border enforcement issues, though it has been criticized as “disjointed”
and incomplete policy.80
While Mexico’s southern border with Guatemala—the vast
majority of which is composed of the shallow Suchiate River and the
Petén rainforest—has traditionally been described with adjectives like

75. Arriola Vega, supra note 57.
76. Id. at 6.
77. CHRISTOPHER WILSON & P EDRO V ALENZUELA , WILSON C ENTER M EXICO ’ S
S OUTHERN BORDER S TRATEGY : P ROGRAMA F RONTERA S UR (2014).
78. Alejandra Castillo, The Mexican Government’s Frontera Sur Program: An
Inconsistent Immigration Policy, COUNCIL ON HEMISPHERIC AFFAIRS (OCT. 25, 2016),
http://www.coha.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/The-Mexican-Government%E2%80%99sFrontera-Sur-Program-An-Inconsistent-Immigration-Policy.pdf.
79. Some academics and practitioners have questioned whether this event in fact
constituted a “crisis,” given that the numbers of women and children who arrived on the U.S.’s
southern border that summer constituted neither a historic high in immigration nor an increase
in arrivals to the U.S. out of line with recent trends in migration. See, e.g., Arriola Vega, supra
note 57; Karen Musalo & Eunice Lee, Seeking a Rational Response to a Regional Refugee
Crisis: Lessons from the Summer 2014 “Surge” of Central American Women and Children at
the US-Mexico Border, 5 J. ON M IGRATION AND HUM . S ECURITY 137 (2017); William C.
Gruben, & Tony Payan, “Illegal” Immigration on the U.S.-Mexico Border: Is it Really a
Crisis?, BAKER INSTITUTE FOR PUBLIC POLICY (Oct. 17, 2014, 5:46 PM),
https://www.bakerinstitute.org/research/illegal-immigration-usmexico-border-it-reallycrisis/.
80. Arriola Vega, supra note 57.

KERWIN - THE MEXICAN ASYLUM SYSTEM FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

2018]

5/15/2018 12:34 PM

THE MEXICAN ASYLUM SYSTEM IN REGIONAL CONTEXT

305

“porous”81 (not to say, to a large extent, nonexistent), Plan Frontera Sur
has concentrated immigration enforcement operations particularly in
southern states like Chiapas, Tabasco, Oaxaca, and Veracruz—
sometimes described as a policy of “pushing the U.S. border south” or
creating a new “vertical border”82 within Mexico. This increased
border enforcement, with the collaboration and financing of the U.S.
government largely via Mérida Initiative funds,83 has quickly turned
Mexico into the country that deports the greatest number of Central
Americans; the uptick of deportations from Mexico in recent years
corresponds quite closely with a decrease in deportations from the U.S.
(see Figure 1). Recently, the Trump Administration has proposed
taking border externalization a step further by designating Mexico as
a so-called “Safe Third Country,” which could prevent tens of
thousands of Central American and other asylum-seekers who reach
the U.S. via Mexico from effectively accessing asylum in the U.S. if it
is determined that they could have requested asylum in Mexico.84 It has
also contributed to a fragmentation of migrant routes through southern
Mexico away from the traditional train routes, taking migrants further
from the established network of shelters and exposing them to danger
at the hands of human traffickers and criminal groups.85

81. C LARE RIBANDO S EELKE & KRISTIN F INKLEA , CONG. RESEARCH S ERV.,
RL41349, U.S.-M EXICAN S ECURITY COOPERATION : THE M ÉRIDA INITIATIVE AND
BEYOND , 21 (2017).
82. Cf. José Carlos Yee Quintero & Eduardo Torre Cantalapiedra, Lidiando con la
Frontera Vertical: Estrategias Migratorias de los Hondureños en Tránsito por México
[Dealing with the vertical border: migration strategies of Hondurans in transit through
Mexico], 47 REMHU - REV. INTERDISCIP. MOBIL. HUM. 97, 99–100 (2016).
83. S EELKE & F INKLEA , supra note 81; Arriola Vega, supra note 57, at 6. While the full
extent and nature of cooperation in this area is not publicly known, reports indicate that the
U.S. additionally provides other kinds of technical assistance and equipment to Mexican
authorities as well. ADAM ISACSON , M AUREEN M EYER , & H ANNAH S MITH, Increased
Enforcement at Mexico’s Southern Border: An Update on Security, Migration, and U.S.
Assistance, WASHINGTON OFFICE ON LATIN AMERICA (WOLA), 2 (2015)
https://www.wola.org/files/WOLA_Increased_Enforcement_at_Mexico’s_Southern_Border
_Nov2015.pdf.
84. HUM. RTS. FIRST, D ANGEROUS TERRITORY : M EXICO S TILL NOT S AFE FOR
REFUGEES, 1 (2017).
85. WASHINGTON O FFICE ON LATIN AMERICA, Migration through Mexico: A
Humanitarian Emergency (2016), https://www.wola.org/analysis/migration-through-mexicoa-humanitarian-emergency/.
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FIGURE 186
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The growth in deportations from Mexico in recent years has been
enormous, and almost entirely targeted toward the detention and
deportation of nationals of Guatemala, Honduras, or El Salvador
(“Northern Triangle nationals”).87 Whereas in 2013, Mexico detained
a total of 86,298 individuals and deported 80,902, by 2015 that number
peaked at 198,141 detentions and 181,163 deportations—of which
177,949 detentions (89.8 percent) and 175,136 deportations (96.7
percent) were of Northern Triangle nationals.88 In 2016, Mexico
detained 186,216 and deported 159,872 foreigners, of which 150,035
(80.6 percent) and 149,540 (93.5 percent), respectively, were Northern
Triangle nationals.89
2. INM Detention and Deportation Practices
The principal agency in charge of administering Mexico’s
“deportation machine” is the Instituto Nacional de Migración (INM,
86. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and Secretaría de Gobernación (SEGOB)
statistics.
87. See RODRIGO DOMINGUEZ V ILLEGAS & V ICTORIA R IETIG , M IGRATION P OLICY
INSTITUTE, M IGRANTS DEPORTED FROM THE UNITED S TATES AND M EXICO TO THE
NORTHERN TRIANGLE, A S TATISTICAL AND S OCIOECONOMIC P ROFILE, 1 (2015) (“Together,
the United States and Mexico have apprehended almost 1 million people who originated from
the Northern Triangle of Central America in the past five years, and have deported more than
800,000 of them”).
88. UNIDAD DE P OLÍTICA M IGRATORIA, BOLETÍN MENSUAL DE ESTADÍSTICAS
MIGRATORIAS 2017 (2017).
89. Id.
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National Migration Institute), which carries out the mass detention and
deportation of migrants.90 As an organ of the State, INM is obligated
to act to guarantee the State’s obligation of non-refoulement by
identifying, referring, and, in every case, avoiding the deportation of
individuals who may need international protection.91 However,
practitioners, asylum-seekers, and international human rights
organizations regularly report that INM creates barriers to accessing
the asylum system and sometimes fails to guarantee access even to
those who expressly state their desire to seek asylum.92 Indeed, a recent
survey by Amnesty International found that as many as 40 percent of
respondents who had been detained by INM gave “solid indications”
of having been returned to their home countries despite evidence of a
need for international protection, in likely violation of international
law.93
Asylum-seekers may request asylum before COMAR or INM.
While COMAR offices currently exist only in Mexico City;
Tapachula, Chiapas; and Acayucan, Veracruz, INM delegations exist
throughout the country; the vast majority of potential asylum-seekers
are thus more likely to first come into contact with INM than with
COMAR. Nonetheless, INM officials and asylum-seekers alike see
these delegations as primarily involved in immigration enforcement
procedures, including detention and deportation, rather than
processing of refugee claims.94 While any person in immigration
detention (estación migratoria, EM) has the right to request asylum
before the INM officers, reports of poor detention conditions, abusive
90. ¿Qué hacemos? [What do we do?], INSTITUTO NACIONAL DE MIGRACIÓN,
https://www.gob.mx/inm/que-hacemos (Mex.).
91. Ley de Refugiados. See 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, 22 Apr.
1954, 189 U.N.T.S. 150, art. 33; Case of the Pacheco Tineo Family v. Bolivia, Inter-Am. Ct.
H.R. (Nov. 25, 2013), http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/casos/articulos/seriec_272_ing.pdf;
Rights and Guarantees of Children in the Context of Migration and/or in Need of International
Protection, Advisory Opinion OC-21/14, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Aug. 19, 2014),
http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/opiniones/seriea_21_eng.pdf.
92. Closed Doors: Mexico’s Failure to Protect Central American Refugee and Migrant
Children, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, 48 (2016), https://www.hrw.org/report/2016/03/31/closeddoors/mexicos-failure-protect-central-american-refugee-and-migrant-children; Joselin Barja
Coria, Derechos Cautivos: La situación de las personas migrantes y sujetas a protección
internacional en los centros de detención migratoria: siete experiencias de monitoreo desde
la sociedad civil (2015); Facing Walls: USA and Mexico’s Violations of the Rights of AsylumSeekers, AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL (2017), https://www.amnestyusa.org/reports/facing-wallsusa-mexicos-violation-rights-asylum-seekers/.
93. Descarga el informe ‘Ignoradas y sin protección’, la mortal devolución de personas
solicitantes
de
asilo,
AMNESTY
I NTERNATIONAL ,
(Jan.
23,
2018),
https://amnistia.org.mx/contenido/descarga-el-informe-ignoradas-y-sin-proteccion-la-mortaldevolucion-de-personas-solicitantes-de-asilo/.
94. Closed Doors, supra note 92.
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behavior by immigration officials, a lack of adequate information
inside detention centers about the existence and availability of asylum,
insecurity inside the facilities, and attempts by immigration officials to
dissuade migrants from claiming asylum, or to convince migrants that
they should accept a voluntary deportation95 and come back to seek
asylum in liberty, are common factors that impede migrants from
requesting asylum in detention.96 Of course, migrants in parts of the
country where COMAR is not located are likely to be understandably
wary of approaching INM in liberty to request asylum at all, which
further limits access to protection.
Conditions in Mexican immigration detention centers are
notoriously bad.97 Asylum-seekers and other individuals who may
need international protection detained in INM facilities may request
deportation because they cannot endure the prison-like conditions of
the detention centers.98 For example, the Siglo XXI detention center in
Tapachula, Chiapas—the largest immigration detention facility in
Latin America, with the capacity to hold up to 990 migrants 99—is
badly overcrowded, forcing migrants to sleep on cots or mats in
crowded rooms where lights are left on all night.100 There are separate
95. Unlike in the U.S., prior deportations from Mexico do not in general have future
immigration consequences, so asylum-seekers should not fear future ineligibility for asylum
as a consequence of accepting a deportation. (With the caveat that, if they made a prior asylum
claim, a lack of new facts/persecution in a future claim may be a bar to success on the merits,
as in the U.S.)
96. See generally Closed Doors, supra note 92; see also The Cost of Stemming the Tide:
How Immigration Enforcement Practices in Southern Mexico Limit Migrant Children’s
Access to International Protection, GEORGETOWN LAW HUMAN RIGHTS INSTITUTE, 35
(2015),
https://www.law.georgetown.edu/academics/centers-institutes/human-rightsinstitute/fact-finding/upload/HRI-Fact-Finding-Report-Stemming-the-Tide-WebPDF_English.pdf; Joselin Barja Coria, Derechos Cautivos: La situación de las personas
migrantes y sujetas a protección internacional en los centros de detención migratoria: siete
experiencias de monitoreo desde la sociedad civil (2015).
97. See, e.g., ARDELIO V ARGAS F OSADO , COMISIÓN N ACIONAL DE D ERECHOS
HUMANOS, INFORME 7/2016 DEL M ECANISMO N ACIONAL DE P REVENCIÓN DE LA TORTURA
SOBRE E STACIONES M IGRATORIAS Y E STANCIA P ROVISIONALES EN LOS E STADOS DE
GUERRERO , M ICHOACÁN , NUEVO LEÓN, QUINTANA R OO, S ONORA Y V ERACRUZ (2016)
http://www.cndh.org.mx/sites/all/doc/PrevTortura/7_2016.pdf (Mex.); Valeria Fernández, On
the way to the US, children seeking asylum are often put in Mexico’s detention centers, PRI
(Jan. 3, 2017), https://www.pri.org/stories/2017-01-03/children-fleeing-violence-centralamerica-who-don-t-make-it-us-often-end-mexican; Closed Doors, supra note 92.
98. The Cost of Stemming the Tide, supra note 96, at 35–37; see also CENTER FOR
GENDER AND REFUGEE S TUDIES, NIÑEZ Y MIGRACIÓN EN C ENTRO Y NORTE AMERICA:
CAUSAS ,
POLÍTICAS ,
PRÁCTICAS
Y
DESAFÍOS ,
249–250
(Feb.
2015),
http://www.acnur.org/t3/fileadmin/Documentos/Publicaciones/2015/9927.pdf?view=1.
99. See, e.g. The Cost of Stemming the Tide, supra note 96, at 22, n.85.
100. Closed Doors, supra note 92 (“Accounts from children and adults held in Tapachula’s
Siglo XXI detention center indicate not only that it is overcrowded but also that mattresses are
in short supply; moreover, they described conditions that were far less hygienic than those we
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areas for men, women, and adolescents, aged 13-17101
(unaccompanied children are turned over to child protection
officials).102 Families are generally separated,103 except for mothers
with children aged 12 and under, or adolescent daughters.104 Despite
improvements in the use of alternatives to detention, immigration
detention continues to be “the rule and not the exception.”105
The situation of unaccompanied children in detention is
especially concerning. By law, unaccompanied child asylum-seekers
must be referred to Family Welfare Agency (“DIF”) shelters, where
they must stay at least until the adjudication of their asylum claims.106
The DIF shelters are secure facilities—children cannot leave the
facility and are not integrated into the community—and so are not
completely distinct from detention centers.107 Furthermore, many
unaccompanied adolescent boys and girls, as well as children
accompanied by their mothers, may be held in adult immigration
detention.108 Such detention violates the regulations implementing the
Law on Children’s Rights, which prohibit immigration detention of
children, both accompanied and unaccompanied,109 as well as
saw in the Acayucan immigration detention center.”); The Cost of Stemming the Tide, supra
note 96, at 36; Barja Coria, supra note 96, at 67.
101. The Cost of Stemming the Tide, supra note 96, at 33; Baria Coria, supra note 96, at
67.
102. The Cost of Stemming the Tide, supra note 96 (“Transfer to DIF is the exception
rather than the rule, even though Mexican law calls for the immediate transfer of all
unaccompanied children to DIF shelters.”)
103. Closed Doors, supra note 92, at 86 (“Mexico’s INM-run immigration detention
centers that are authorized to receive children usually have separate sections for adult men,
adolescent boys, and women and girls, meaning that families are generally separated when
they are detained”); GEORGETOWN LAW HUMAN RIGHTS INSTITUTE, The Cost of Stemming
the Tide 33 (2015).
104. Closed Doors, supra note 92, at 87(“Children under the age of 12 are generally
assigned to a detention center’s section for women and girls if they have mothers or other
family members in that section. Unaccompanied boys under 12 may also be held in the section
for women and girls.”); Baria Coria, supra note 96, at 69 (“Los niños y niñas tienen un
tratamiento diferencial según sexo y edad: las niñas de 12 a 17 años permanecen con sus
madres en el módulo de mujeres, pero los niños de la misma edad son detenidos en el área
específica de adolescentes”).
105. Simón Hernández León, La política de detención de solicitantes de asilo en Mexico
y su impacto en la integridad personal, NEXOS, February 27, 2018,
https://eljuegodelacorte.nexos.com.mx/?p=7777.
106. Reglamento de la Ley General de los Derechos de Niñas, Niños y Adolescentes
[RLGDNNA], Diario Oficial de la Federación [DOF] 02-12-2015.
107. See, e.g. Closed Doors, supra note 92, at 104.
108. See also Facing Walls, supra note 92, at 32–33.
109. Reglamento de la Ley General de los Derechos de Niñas, Niños y Adolescentes
[RLGDNNA], Art. 111, Diario Oficial de la Federación [DOF] 02-12-2015. [T2: Foreign
Jurisdictions – Mexico – Regulations] (“Migrant children, whether or not traveling in the
company of an adult person, shall at no time be deprived of their liberty in detention centers,
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international law.110
3. Issues Within the Asylum System
The repressive logic of Mexico’s migration system is further
replicated within aspects of its international protection system,
principally in limitations placed on asylum-seekers’ freedom of
movement during the adjudication process, as well as the treatment of
unaccompanied or separated migrant children.
COMAR places a variety of restrictions on asylum-seekers’
freedom of movement during the adjudication process with the
apparent aim of preventing movement within the country, including
northward, during adjudication. Asylum-seekers are not permitted to
travel outside of the Mexican state in which they request asylum
without prior authorization by COMAR until they receive a positive
adjudication of their application;111 transfers within Mexico are
generally permitted only for reasons of personal safety or upon proof
of relation to a family member in another part of the country who can
demonstrate financial ability to receive the asylum-seeker.112 COMAR
tends to be quite stringent with requests for transfer of asylum-seekers,
likely because transfers away from states where it has delegations
place administrative burdens on COMAR, and because it tends to be
suspicious of requests to relocate further north in Mexico, perhaps
considering that individuals will seek to abandon their claims in
nor in any other immigration detention facility.”)
110. Rights and Guarantees of Children in the Context of Migration and/or in Need of
International Protection, Advisory Opinion OC-21/14, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. ¶ 154 (Aug. 19,
2014), http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/opiniones/seriea_21_eng.pdf (“[T]he Court finds that
the deprivation of liberty of children based exclusively on migratory reasons exceeds the
requirement of necessity, because this measure is not absolutely essential in order to ensure
their appearance at the immigration proceedings or to guarantee the implementation of a
deportation order … [T]he Court finds that the deprivation of liberty of a child in this context
can never be understood as a measure that responds to the child’s best interest. …In sum …
the deprivation of liberty of a child migrant in an irregular situation, ordered on this basis
alone, is arbitrary and, consequently, contrary to both the Convention and the American
Declaration.”); Comm. on the Rights of the Child, General Comment No. 6: Treatment of
Unaccompanied and Separated Children Outside their Country of Origin, ¶ 61, U.N. Doc.
CRC/GC/2005/6 (Sept. 1, 2005), http://www.refworld.org/docid/42dd174b4.html;
DETENTION GUIDELINES : GUIDELINES ON THE APPLICABLE C RITERIA AND S TANDARDS
RELATING TO THE D ETENTION OF ASYLUM -S EEKERS AND ALTERNATIVES TO DETENTION ,
UNHCR, Guideline 9.2 (2012), http://www.unhcr.org/505b10ee9.html.
111. See generally Facing Walls, note 92 (making the argument to put in place special
mechanisms for vulnerable groups of asylum-seekers, in particular transgender women, that
may need to be urgently transferred from border areas to other parts of the country to await
the outcome of their asylum proceedings).
112. Interview with representatives from Fray Matías Centro de Derechos Humanos, Sin
Fronteras, Clínica Jurídica de Refugiados “Alaíde Foppa,” supra note 14.
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Mexico and travel on to the United States if they are permitted freedom
of movement during the asylum process.113 Additionally, asylumseekers may be required to check in (“ir a firmar”) weekly with
COMAR and/or INM in the place where their asylum claim is being
adjudicated to ensure that the person is following through with the
asylum application and process.114
The situation of unaccompanied or separated children in Mexico
is particularly concerning. While estimates indicate that more than half
of Central American children in Mexico may be in need of
international protection, the number of asylum claims presented yearly
by unaccompanied children is shockingly low. In 2015, for example,
Mexico detained about 18,000 unaccompanied children, but fewer than
150 of them (less than one percent) lodged asylum claims.115 While it
seems likely that this is attributable in part to the fact that many or most
unaccompanied children are seeking to reunite with family members
in the United States, the low rate of asylum claims brought by
unaccompanied children is also caused by grave problems in Mexico’s
child protection system.116
Unaccompanied children who present asylum claims are housed
in Family Welfare Agency (DIF) shelters, which are closed-door
facilities.117 This situation likely leads some youth to abandon potential
asylum claims to avoid prolonged detention. Furthermore, if an
unaccompanied child is recognized as a refugee and cannot be reunited
with family in Mexico, they will be required to live in the care of the
State in a DIF shelter until they turn eighteen years old, as they are
unlikely to be released into foster care due to lack of family
placements.118 This arrangement may make unaccompanied children
understandably wary of seeking asylum in Mexico, particularly if they

113. Id. COMAR’s role should not be one of policing the U.S. border by preventing
asylum-seekers from reaching the United States, or one of obliging individuals to pursue
asylum in Mexico only. In reality, an individual may have genuine protection needs but also
desire to rejoin family in the United States for needed support during the asylum process and
upon recognition of refugee status. Family unity is in fact recognized as fundamental in
Mexico’s Refugee Law (art. 5), as well as in international law. Problems with delays and
inaccessibility of services in Mexico may also contribute to a decision to abandon the process
and/or continue on to the United States.
114. Id.
115. Estadísticas 2013–2017, supra note 6. The number of unaccompanied children
seeking asylum has not increased significantly in subsequent years: COMAR reports that just
141 unaccompanied children sought asylum in 2015; 242 in 2016; and 259 in 2017. Id.
116. Id.
117. See Closed Doors, supra note 92.
118. Id. at 98 (suggesting that foster care is a possibility that should be explored).
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have family in the U.S. who they are seeking to rejoin.119 Yet they may
have no other choice beyond seeking asylum in Mexico in order to
avoid deportation back to a country where they may face extreme
danger.
IV. CONCLUSION
The issues facing Mexico’s international protection system
examined in this Article signal serious challenges for effective access
to the asylum system and fair adjudication of asylum claims.
Throughout the process, barriers to receiving information about
asylum, effectively presenting asylum petitions, receiving access to the
rights and guarantees associated with asylum-seeker and refugee
status, and integrating into Mexican society limit the effectiveness of
international protection in Mexico. This particularly affects those who
are detained and deported summarily without appropriate screening
and referral for possible international protection needs, but also those
who find themselves unable to get by in the country, whether due to
procedural delays and inaccessibility of services in Mexico or because
they need support from family in other countries with which they have
been unable to reunite. This is particularly the case for unaccompanied
children. In this regard, continued efforts to improve governmental and
non-governmental aid and services available to asylum-seekers and
refugees in Mexico are vitally necessary. By the same token, these
realities do not relieve Mexico’s migration system of the obligation to
ensure access to international protection in Mexico to those who
pursue it.

119. Though they travel alone, unaccompanied children most often have adults in the
country of origin who send them, and adults in the country of destination waiting to receive
them. This is evident, for example, in the rate of release of unaccompanied children detained
by U.S. border enforcement into private custody, as well as from extensive personal
testimonies by parents and children who have made the journey to the U.S. For example, in
FY 2016, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) reported that it apprehended
59,757 unaccompanied children, who are then transferred to the custody of the Office of
Refugee Resettlement (ORR); during the same year, ORR reported that it released 52,147
children (87.2 percent of the total apprehended by DHS) to the custody of family members in
the U.S. DHS Releases End of Year Fiscal Year 2016 Statistics, DHS (Dec. 30, 2016),
https://www.dhs.gov/news/2016/12/30/dhs-releases-end-year-fiscal-year-2016-statistics;
Unaccompanied Alien Children Released to Sponsors by State, ORR (June 30, 2017),
https://www.acf.hhs.gov/orr/resource/unaccompanied-alien-children-released-to-sponsorsby-state. See also John Bowden, Federal officials lose track of nearly 1,500 Migrant Children
in US, THE HILL (Apr. 27, 2018), http://thehill.com/latino/385148-federal-officials-lose-trackof-nearly-1500-migrant-children-in-us. Although there are certainly cases of children, usually
orphaned or abandoned, who flee their countries alone because there is no one in the world to
care for them, they are in the minority.

